#4191775

OTDIH, 4/19/1775 the American War of Independence began. Tensions had been high all spring, and there were many flashpoints where things could have gone differently, but in the early morning hours of April 19, 1775 shots were fired at Lexington and hostilities began.

On April 18th, 1775 Paul Revere set out on the ride that would be immortalized by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow almost a century later. On April 19th, 1775 the militia of Massachusetts fought a running battle with the British forces that lasted most of the day and covered the route from Boston to Concord. This battle has been mislabeled as the Battle of Lexington & Concord, when the fiercest fighting took place in Menotomy, and Lexington & Concord were actually minor skirmishes in the whole affair.

To recognize the event, here’s something I wrote:

10 Myths of Lexington & Concord

1.) American militia were a disorganized mob that fought individually with their own initiative. This is a common view that owes it’s origins mostly to British reports after, and then national pride later as the image of the simple farmer taking down his musket to fight tyranny became idealized.

The truth of the matter is different. David Hackett Fischer points out that during the battle American militia faced off against British forces at least six times in formation. British reports state that they were swarmed by men, but not in groups larger than 50. 50 is almost exactly the size recommended by the Massachusetts Provincial Congress for militia companies, which indicates that the militia responded in company sized units and fought under the direction of their captains.

John R. Galvin points out that the militia were organized and directed to form a sort of circling force of the British. Companies would arrive and would be directed as to where to go to make sure that the British were under constant fire from both sides and the rear.

2.) The Revolutionary War started because of attempts at gun control. This one is just plain silly for several reasons:

The orders given by Gage specifically stated that private property was to be left untouched (of course after the fighting started soldiers began looting).
Concord was a major supply depot of war materiel. The Mass Provincial Congress had made plans to outfit and supply an army of 15,000 men, and had been gathering supplies to do so. The supplies were split into two main depots. The larger one was at Worcester, and the other one was at Concord. Here are some of the materials that were stored at Concord:

At no point during the search in Lexington or Concord were private homes searched for private weapons. Homeswere searched for the munitions and stores, but that’s something else entirely.

• 10 tons of musket balls/cartridges
  
• 35 half-barrels of powder
  
• 350 tents
  
• 14 med chests
  
• 80 barrels of beef
  
• 8 ½ tons salt fish
  
• 17 ½ tons rye
  
• 318 barrels flour
  
• 100 barrels salt
  
• 20 bushels oatmeal (a little small considering the captain of the Concord militia grew oats)
  
• plus all sorts of other camp things like shovels, candles, etc.
  

In addition to all these supplies there were four brass cannon that had been stolen from Boston right under the British noses (literally–they were taken in broad daylight while there were soldiers on guard), two brass mortars, and at least three iron cannon.

3.) Dr. Joseph Warren had a high level informant within the British camp. This one has been speculated about for awhile, but I particularly blame David Hackett Fischer for this one, as he comes directly out and claims that Margaret Gage was passing information to Warren. Then the “History” Channel’s Sons of Liberty takes it a step further and claims that Margaret Gage & Warren were having an affair (didn’t realize that my April Fool’s Day post had been taken seriously.

There’s no evidence that there was even a high level source needed, as it was common knowledge on the street that the British would eventually be going after the supplies. when the British ships started lowering boats to transport troops across the Mystic River to begin their march, he called for Revere in “much haste” (according to Revere’s account) and told Revere to go rouse the militia.More debunking of the high level informant myth can be found here.

4.) The whole idea of “Paul Revere’s Ride”. It should really be called “Paul Revere, William Dawes, Samuel Prescott, and a whole bunch of people from the city who were travelling at night” ride. Of course this myth is all Longfellow’s fault because of his catchy poem. The truth is that Dawes was sent out first, because Warren was aware of increased activity and wanted to let Hancock & Adams know. At that point Warren didn’t know for sure that the British force would be heading out. Later the British started to unload boats to transport the troops across the Mystic River, at which point Warren summoned Revere with “much haste” and told Revere to go raise the alarm.

Neither man made it to Concord. In addition to Revere and Dawes there was Dr. Prescott who was out late returning from visiting his fiance. He joined the two men and was instrumental in raising further alarms. There were also a whole host of other travelers on the road that night.

Dawes left on his journey about 8pm, Revere about 10pm. The Lexington militia actually received word about a possible British march around 7 or 8 pm and even called out the militia, who waited around for awhile and then dispersed, waiting for further news.Info on the timeline of Revere’s and Dawes rides can be found here.

5.) The militia units were a poorly trained rabble. The origins of this myth lie with the British officers contempt of the way that MA militia did drill and dressed. While the militia certainly didn’t look like British soldiers, they actually trained from the same sources. Each militia commander was in charge of training his militia, and most of them used British manuals to do so. In the months leading up to the fighting on April 19th, militia units were meeting as much as 3 or 4 times a week to drill–especially the minute companies.

Galvin points out that the MA militia at this time was probably the best trained in America. Fischer points out that maybe up to 1/3rd of the militia may have had fighting experience in the French & Indian War.

6.) The British soldiers were crack soldiers with years of experience.

Don Hagist mentions that the British Army in America was essentially a peace time army. Even though many of the British soldiers in America had been with the army for years, that didn’t indicate service during the Seven Years’ War or the French & Indian War.

The soldiers who were sent on this mission had never worked with each other before. The strike force was composed of grenadiers and light infantry from several different units, serving under a commander they weren’t familiar with. Also several officers attached themselves to the force as volunteers, confusing things even further. So the British command structure was confusing in addition to the lack of comfort with each other.

7.) One of the targets of the British raid was the capture of John Hancock and Samuel Adams, who were staying in Lexington. This was certainly the fear of Dr. Warren (who was in charge of the Boston Committee of Safety intelligence operations), but again, the orders given by Gage don’t mention Hancock or Adams at all.

8.) The American militia was so successful against the British in the fighting because Americans were sharpshooters using rifles.

The fact is, rifles were extremely rare in MA, and the militia were armed with a wide variety of weapons. It’s highly unlikely that there were any rifles on the field that day at all. The most common weapon on both sides was likely the Brown Bess, simply because of the numbers of Brown Bess muskets that had been decommissioned from the French & Indian War, plus of course the weapons being used by the British were also almost all Brown Bess muskets.

Matthew Spring talks about the differences in British shooting vs American. He points out two factors that made a key difference during engagements. The first is that the American soldiers & militia often double or triple loaded their muskets. They’d put one large ball in with two smaller ones, essentially turning it into an upgraded shotgun. The other key factor was the flints used by American forces which were of a superior grade to British flints. This meant fewer misfires and longer usage before needing to replace the flints.

9.) The British soldiers were at a disadvantage because they relied on marching in straight rows, making them easy targets. This is a particularly bad bit of history, especially for the fighting on April 19th. During the retreat Colonel Francis Smith organized his force so that the grenadiers marched in the rear and the light infantry acted as skirmishers. This meant that the light infantry companies would range alongside the road, clearing out enemy forces that got too close. This proved particularly deadly at Menotomy, where some of the bitterest fighting of the whole retreat took place.

In addition, British tactics in North America were decidedly different than what were used elsewhere. They adapted their tactics to the terrain, and used the terrain to their advantage. This is especially true of the light infantry companies.

10.) Paul Revere shouted “The British are coming” galloping through the streets of the towns of militia. This image also goes back to Longfellow, as well as to subsequent film & tv about the event. The truth is that Revere didn’t just wildly gallop through town. He stopped at prominent local leaders and then moved on to the next town. The local leaders then roused the militia and sent out riders to towns further out. Those riders contacted leaders in those towns, who sent out further advanced riders, etc. We don’t know the words he actually used, but “redcoat” wasn’t a popular term at the time (though it wasn’t unheard of). It was likely “The regulars are out”, or “The army is marching” or words to that effect.

Some Sources:

With Zeal and With Bayonets Only: The British Army on Campaign in North America, 1775–1783 by Matthew Spring

The Minute Men: The First Fight: Myths and Realities of the American Revolution by John R. Galvin

Paul Revere’s Ride by David Hackett Fischer

British Soldiers, American War: Voices of the American Revolution by Don Hagist

bantarleton:

British light infantry deploying. 

Light infantry, acting in their role as skirmishers, were extremely effective against American militia on April 19, 1775. The very existence of the light infantry (in use since the French & Indian War) should dispel the old myth of the stupid redcoat marching in straight lines to his doom against the American sharpshooter.

Ironically enough, the American militia used the same training manuals (for the most part) as did their British counter-parts. It wasn’t until von Steuben’s arrival that a distinctive American training manual appeared, and he mostly synthesized the best from various European manuals.