Distinction between “ethics” & “not economics”

Dave: “According to my interpretation of him [Graf/me], we can use is-statements to describe what rights are and to determine what is a violation of rights. The only ought-statement in the area of rights answers the simple question, ought we to fulfill the duties defined by property rights? (In case I am not being clear, note that Graf does not claim that this is the only ought question in the realm of morality, just the only ought-statement that pertains to this particular subject, property rights.)”

I think this is a good representation of one of the main points I was making, yes (although “rights” is problematic, as so much easy confusion is associated with the word, so I use NAP violations, as defined within, to be more specific).

I argue that the use of the word “ethics” in Rothbard’s and Hoppe’s works (right in the titles) has also helped cement confusion in this area. They were speaking almost entirely of property theory, which is within the domain of legal theory. “Ethics” has been used in Austrian circles to differentiate some “not economics” issues from economics; the problem being that there was more than one field that was “not economics” for these purposes and this fact was more profound than was generally recognized. I argue that ethics proper is one such field while property/legal theory is quite another (and, linked by praxeological, counterfactual method, relatively closer to (Misesian) economics than to ethics).

The simplest illustrative version is to say that property/legal theory tells what theft IS, while ethical theory can offer advice on whether or not one ought to engage in activities thereby defined as theft. Totally different issues. Ethical theory advises on action decisions; property/legal theory does the defining: “So now that you know what theft is (thanks to property/legal theory), what are you going to do about it? (consult ethics, etc.).”

By this point, legal positivism is irrelevant to understanding in terms of justice, and the Matrix has been exited. NAP violations are defined in the context of a specific field of knowledge with its own methods and validity criteria that are completely independent of the claims of any jurisdiction and indeed regardless of time or place. Specifics of time and place are addressed under interpretation (Mises’s “thymology”) and legal practice (which has/should have its own ethical principles!), as distinct from legal theory itself.

—Konrad Graf