#viennacircle
This post was written by Simone Mohite, a recipient of an Archival Scholar Research Award for the 2021 Spring Semester.
2020 has proved to be anything but ordinary. With the sudden onset of the coronavirus, millions of people comprising a non-scientific jury tried to determine the rules of survival. To wear a mask or not to wear a mask? Are vaccines safe or is the data weird? Is this science, or is it pseudo-science?
Although dismissive statements about science and questionable “scientific” claims in the public sphere are routine, the coronavirus epidemic has shown us that it is even more difficult to know who and what to trust when the doctors and scientists offer conflicting guidance. We all want to know the truth that science can tell us—in this case, to keep us safe—but what classifies something as science in the first place? To answer this question, I turned to philosopher Carl Gustav Hempel’s work on logical empiricism. I examined a manuscript from 1981 in which to understand how Hempel developed his ideas before they were ‘fixed’ into print and disseminated.
The manuscript I chose was titled “Logical empiricism: Its problems and changes.” It is the revised text of a lecture delivered by Hempel in China in 1981. On the very first page, there is a note that says, “Revised and Submitted to Hung.” I was curious to know why Hempel was in China giving this lecture on the recent history of Western philosophy. As it was towards the end of his career, I wanted to know if Hempel had taken an interest in Chinese Philosophy, or if philosophers in China had taken an interest in him.
(Above) Title with inscription “Revised, Submitted to Hung, 6/9/81,” Logical Empiricism: It’s Problems and It’s Changes by Carl G. Hempel, Box 57, Folder 7, Carl Gustav Hempel Papers, 1903-1997, ASP.1999.01, Archives of Scientific Philosophy, Archives & Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh Library System.
Before assessing the content, I began by examining the document itself. The first half of the manuscript is mainly typewritten. In the second half of this document are what appear to be Hempel’s notes for the lecture, mainly made using a black ink pen; however, visible changes and edits were made with a pencil. It looks as if the document were written in a journal notebook, from both the size of the writing and comparing it to the typewritten pages. His handwriting on these notes is significantly more legible than other notes available at the archive under Hempel’s name, which made me think someone else was probably supposed to read this – possibly for more edits.
(Above) Page 1, typed, Logical Empiricism: It’s Problems and It’s Changes by Carl G. Hempel, Box 57, Folder 7, Carl Gustav Hempel Papers, 1903-1997, ASP.1999.01, Archives of Scientific Philosophy, Archives & Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh Library System.
(Above) Page 2, notes. Logical Empiricism: It’s Problems and It’s Changes by Carl G. Hempel, Box 57, Folder 7, Carl Gustav Hempel Papers, 1903-1997, ASP.1999.01, Archives of Scientific Philosophy, Archives & Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh Library System.
Another thing I found interesting was Hempel’s remarks on the second page in the handwritten journal. They stated, “I remember my teachers with great respect and gratitude, but in the course of time, I have found certain difficulties in their ideas” (Hempel, 1981). Hempel then omits this from the revised text. I plan to delve deeper into Hempel’s correspondence to see which teachers he may be referring to and how he came to disagree with their ideas. I noticed other omissions between the two versions of the text, but they seem generic, as if he was refining his language for publishing this text.
(Above) Page 22, notes. Examples of generic corrections in the lecture. Logical Empiricism: It’s Problems and It’s Changes by Carl G. Hempel, Box 57, Folder 7, Carl Gustav Hempel Papers, 1903-1997, ASP.1999.01, Archives of Scientific Philosophy, Archives & Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh Library System.
I then turned my attention to the content of these versions of Hempel’s texts. My brief analysis helped me develop two insights, and additional research helped me begin to answer my questions about Hempel’s relation to China and Chinese philosophy. First, this manuscript helped me figure out what the Logical Empiricists and members of the Vienna Circle characterized ‘pseudoscience’. To my surprise, figuring out what separated scientific truth from metaphysics was an issue that logical empiricists, like Hempel, were thinking about back in the 1930s! They were concerned with verifications and considered any metaphysical statement meaningless.
Second, this manuscript provides evidence of who had influenced Hempel’s philosophy and who he may have had corresponded with. In Hempel’s lecture he mentioned a few recurring references to philosophers in Berlin and the Vienna Circle, such as Otto Neurath, Hans Reichenbach and Rudolph Carnap. However, the one that particularly interested me was “Professor Hung” – likely the same Hung from the first page!
As it turns out, I soon discovered that ‘Professor Hung’ was Tscha Hung, a Chinese Philosopher who was curious about logical empiricism and the foundations of truth (Cohen, 1996). This evidence provided an answer to my initial question: it seems Hempel was invited to China because Hung had an interest in Logical Empiricism and Western philosophy. Cohen (1996) mentions that he had heard of Hung while having a conversation with Marie Neurath Reading Hempel’s notes in the second half of this manuscript, I found Hempel’s account of meeting Professor Hung in Vienna. Apparently, Hung also attended the Vienna Circle meetings or one of the classes taught by either Moritz Schlick or Carnap. Hempel also mentions that the next encounter he had with Professor Hung was when he was giving a lecture in China 50 years later! Comparing the handwritten lecture and the revised version, I saw that Hempel had omitted this story about meeting Hung, which was surprising to me, considering that he was delivering this lecture in person, with Professor Hung in attendance. However, the final typewritten version might be an article he wrote, based on said lecture, so that may have led him to cut out all the informal sentences spoken at this lecture.
Works Cited
Cohen, R. S., Risto. Hilpinen, and Renzong. Qiu. “Realism and Anti-Realism in the Philosophy of Science : Beijing International Conference, 1992 ” Dordrecht ;: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996.
Carl Gustav Hempel Papers, 1903-1997, ASP.1999.01, Archives of Scientific Philosophy, Archives & Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh Library System
